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I. Introduction
Masaji Chiba (1989, 2002) illustrated that legal pluralism cannot be simplified as a 
dual construction of state and non-state laws alone. One can observe the accommodation 
of transplanted laws within both official and unofficial settings, and at the same time, 
the penetration of indigenous laws into the official state law. Therefore, empirical 
descriptions of the infrastructure of legal pluralism require more than a single set of 
dichotomies. Chiba observed the combination of three sets of dichotomies in legal 
pluralism: (1) legal postulates/legal rules, (2) indigenous/transplanted laws and (3) 
official/unofficial laws.
However, concerning the first dichotomy of legal postulates and legal rules, there is 
room for methodological modifications2). This paper postulates that a shortcoming of 
the dichotomy is its limited applicability to empirical research on dispute processes, 
since the dichotomy is modelled on the layered structure of official legislation. Thus, 
this paper proposes replacing the original dichotomy of legal postulates and legal rules 
with an alternative dichotomy of the formal and substantive ways of legal reasoning, 
which represent different modes of argument in dispute processes. The cases for 
analysis in this paper are taken from civil disputes concerning the legal conditions of 
marriage by the customary law of the Gusii of Western Kenya. 3)
Modification and Application of Chiba’s Theory
Masaji Chiba proposed three dichotomies within his theory of legal pluralism. How 
can empirical legal research utilise these dichotomies? This paper lays out two major 
objectives and examines the effectiveness of the three dichotomies for research on 
legal pluralism. 
The first objective is to clarify certain conceptual aspects of the three dichotomies, 
particularly to provide a practical suggestion on the theoretical issues surrounding the 
modification of the dichotomy between legal rules and legal postulates. In his paper, 
published in a Japanese journal, Chiba raised ‘two issues to modify my previous 
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concepts’ (Chiba 2003, p. 292, my translation). One of the two issues will be addressed 
in this paper.
Two points that I wish to modify in my theory on legal culture are the 
significance of the dichotomy of legal rules and legal postulates among the 
three dichotomies, and the concept of law as a social norm (its requirements in 
particular). With regards to the former, the author acknowledges that my 
explanations are not sufficient. Among the three dichotomies, the dichotomy 
between official and unofficial laws and the dichotomy between indigenous 
and transplanted laws, in addition to the identity postulate of a legal culture, 
are generally well accepted by readers. In contrast, the dichotomy between 
legal rules and legal postulates is not as well accepted as the other two 
dichotomies. Young researchers from Turkey and Tahiti who told me that the 
former two dichotomies were useful to their research remain silent about the 
last dichotomy... 
The first objective of this paper is to address the modification of the dichotomy 
between legal rules and legal postulates. Since Chiba has acknowledged that an 
anthropological approach is indispensable for conceptualising the dichotomy, it seems 
necessary for legal anthropologists to respond to his invitation. 
The second objective of this paper is to apply the three new dichotomies to empirical 
analysis. Through such an application, the paper attempts to clarify the methods of 
using Chiba’s theory. Since Chiba’s concepts are highly abstract and difficult to 
interpret, some scholars have pointed out that they do not know exactly how to use 
those analytical tools (Aoki 2002, p. 13). 
As explained above, the two major objectives of this paper are first to modify 
Chiba’s three dichotomies, and second, to apply the three new dichotomies obtained 
by the modification to a set of empirical legal research. In my view, the three-dichotomy 
theory is most effective when used for analysing dispute processes that are informed 
by the parties’ expression of their claims and legal arguments.
Three-Dichotomy Theory
In order to understand Chiba’s theory, one must begin with the precondition that 
legal systems in all regions and countries are pluralistic, regardless of whether they are 
Western (Chiba 1989, pp. 4-5, 2002, pp.7-8, Menski 2006, p. 83, see also Merry 1988, 
pp. 872-873). Pluralistic here means that the legal systems exist as a hybrid. However, 
a more positive development of the theory is possible if ‘pluralistic’ is understood as 
the theory for analysing the complex and dynamic process of pluralisation rather than 
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the pluralistic situation (Menski 2006). 
The three dichotomies that constitute the basic theoretical framework of Chiba’s 
theory of legal pluralism are as follows (Chiba 1989, pp. 177-180, 2002, pp. 16-20 & 
pp. 234-236). 
Official and unofficial laws: whether the law is authorised by the public authority of 
a state. 
Transplanted and indigenous laws: whether the law originates in the native culture 
of a socio–legal entity or in foreign cultures. 
Legal rules and legal postulates: the contrast of positive rules with latent values.
Among these three, the dichotomy between official and unofficial laws represents 
opposite extremes or polarities. An analysis of their polarities allows us to compare the 
features of the legal system in terms of the existence or lack of public sanctions. 
Likewise, the dichotomy between transplanted and indigenous laws represents the 
opposite extremes for capturing the legal cultural origins of a particular law. In 
contrast, as explained in detail in subsection 1-3, the dichotomy between legal rules 
and legal postulates represents the opposite extremes for capturing how social norms 
in question are formularised. 4)
In my view, the essence of Chiba’s theory of the three dichotomies lies in his attempt 
to capture social norms, as follows: his three-dimensional structure consists of three 
sets of opposite extremes, between which social norms flexibly move in a manner that 
adapts their attributes or places within the integral whole of the legal system in 
question. For example, the process of how a particular social norm that was categorised 
as an unofficial law gradually gains the status of an official law may also be characterised 
as the process by which a social norm formularised within an indigenous law becomes 
the one formularised within transplanted laws (Examples from this paper support this 
point). Accordingly, the three dichotomies are useful for capturing the dynamic 
processes of pluralisation from three-dimensional viewpoints.
According to Chiba, legal pluralism can be observed as ‘the combination of three 
dichotomies’ (Chiba 1989, p. 179). My understanding on this point is as described 
above. However, the connotation of the word ‘combination’ seems to lead to the 
perception that Chiba’s theory is difficult to understand. For example, Nobuyuki 
Yasuda once interpreted Chiba’s three dichotomies as follows: 
The three dichotomies were formulated in order to understand individual laws 
from different aspects such as power, culture and norm structures. Relations 
between the different sets of dichotomies are not clearly defined. However, in 
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Asia and other non-Western countries, one may find out an overlapping dual 
relationship among them: official law as transplanted law as legal rules versus 
unofficial law as indigenous law as legal postulates (Yasuda 1997, pp. 124-
125, my translation). 
In the above paragraph, the portion beginning with ‘in Asia and other non-Western 
countries’ may invite methodological misunderstandings with regard to the 
‘combinations’. Chiba himself does not uniformly correlate the other two dichotomies 
with the official/unofficial dichotomy (Chiba 1986, p. 389, Rouland 1994, pp. 61-62). 
Chiba thought of cases in which transplanted and indigenous laws are treated in 
practice as official laws within the state legal system, or in which unofficial laws 
gradually penetrate into state laws (Chiba 1989, Chapter 7). 
Legal Rules and Legal Postulates
With regard to the dichotomy between legal rules and legal postulates at issue, legal 
rules within Chiba’s theory are ‘the formalised verbal expressions of particular legal 
regulations’, while legal postulates are particular values and ideas, which justify, 
criticise, supplement, revise or form the basis of legal rules. Both concepts can be 
contrasted with each other (Chiba 1989, p. 178). Furthermore, within state laws that 
are written and strictly formulated, legal postulates merely play a supplementary role, 
but more stress is exerted on legal postulates than on legal rules within the realm of 
religious or customary laws. Thus, the dichotomy between legal rules and legal 
postulates may be viewed as a methodological concept for comparing the laws by 
capturing the qualitative characteristics of the formalisation or formality of social 
norms (Chiba 2002, pp. 18-19, pp. 194-195 & p. 235, 2003, p. 293). 
With regard to the dichotomy between legal rules and legal postulates, Chiba 
acknowledged that modifications are possible in the following sense. ‘The relationship 
between legal rules and legal postulates within the state law of the West almost 
certainly corresponds to the legal system and the legal principle. On the other hand, 
non-Western laws, particularly indigenous laws, cannot be sufficiently captured by 
modern scientific concepts’ (Chiba 1996, p. 17, my translation). In other words, Chiba 
admits that the dichotomy between legal rules and legal postulates originates in the 
two-layered structure of state laws. It seems that he admits the existence of laws that 
only encompass legal postulates. In short, Chiba questions whether the dichotomy 
between legal rules and legal postulates can be uniformly applied to the comparisons 
of various laws, or whether such a dichotomy as a conceptual tool for comparative 
analysis. 
This paper makes two methodological suggestions. The first is to place the 
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dichotomy between legal rules and legal postulates within an analysis of the dispute 
process. An analysis of non-Western laws using the dichotomy may be possible if 
dispute processes are turned into models where postulates implicitly justify, criticise 
or supplement explicit rules.
In order to apply the three dichotomies to the dispute process analysis, it is necessary 
to radicalise the way the dichotomy between legal rules and legal postulates is 
interpreted. In order to do so, the dichotomy must be observed within the processes by 
which social norms are formularised; the process that results when the claims or 
arguments of parties clash until consensus is achieved or the court delivers a judgment. 
In short, my first suggestion is that we should capture the processes by which legal 
postulates gradually gain status as legal rules made through adversarial processes. 
There is, however, a methodological defect in implementing this first suggestion. To 
the same extent that there are no written rules in unofficial laws, there may not be any 
systematic ending point, such as a court judgment, in unofficial dispute resolutions. 
Therefore, a new dichotomy should be entirely separate from the dichotomy between 
legal rules and legal postulates found within the temporal sequence that exists from the 
adversarial stage to the judgment stage. The qualitative characteristics of claim 
expressions by parties to disputes, which appear prior to the court judgment, are turned 
into models. This is the initial stage of modifying the dichotomy between legal rules 
and legal postulates, and of obtaining the new dichotomy. 
Accordingly, I propose using the dichotomy between the formal and substantive 
ways of legal reasoning. If contending parties do not merely put forward their claims 
to each other by making their interests explicit, but rather express their claims in a 
formularised manner in some way, the new dichotomy can be used to capture the 
qualitative characteristics for such formulations. As explained in detail later in section 
2, empirical examples of what constitutes marriage in the Gusii community of Kenya 
demonstrate that formal reasoning includes the views legally defining marriage, based 
on material indicators such as dowry (bride price) payment5) or legal documents 
(submission of relevant information on the national identity cards issued by the 
Kenyan government). Substantive reasoning refers to the recognition of the legal 
significance of marriage from practical facts such as cohabitation and spousal support. 
I presented this new dichotomy at recent conferences and other research meetings. 
There, some criticised my distinction between formal reasoning (referring to dowry 
payments and listing of relevant information on identity cards) and substantive 
reasoning (referring to cohabitation or spousal support). The basis of these criticisms 
appears to be that the transactions of dowry payments themselves show the practical 
aspects of a relationship.
These criticisms are reasonable in a certain respect. Dowry items in East African 
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local communities are generally paid in instalments and sometimes may be paid over 
many years. Anthropologically speaking, the gift exchange between parties has a 
social value by itself because it connects people and serves some communicative 
purposes, and thus, the value of gifts cannot merely be determined by the price of the 
gift. However, certain examples in this paper suggest that there are potential problems 
in the pending or outstanding payments of dowry items. Moreover, the reverse logic 
leads to an issue in that the non-payment of dowry means the non-existence of a 
marital relationship. 
The formal reasoning of the legal conditions of marriage, in my definition, is to 
capture a continuous and expanding social relationship by minimising it and explaining 
it with a singular or limited set of material symbols. This invokes the concepts of Ian 
Macneil’s theory of contract. Following this model, the dichotomy between the formal 
and substantive ways of legal reasoning characterises the choice between capturing 
marriage as a contract with the ‘discrete contract’ model and capturing it with the 
‘relational contract’ model (Macneil 1980).
There may also be other issues in the new dichotomy proposed here. For example, 
my dichotomy may appear to be significantly different from that of Chiba, namely the 
dichotomy between legal rules and legal postulates that contrasted explicit rules with 
implicit values. Second, for example, the contrast between formal reasoning and 
substantive reasoning may also be too general to constitute a dichotomy. However, 
with regard to the first issue, Chiba recognised that a dichotomy that allows a 
comparative analysis of the qualitative characteristics of the formalisation is required. 
In fact, I attempt to show the validity of the dichotomy between the formal and the 
substantive ways of legal reasoning through an analysis of how a party’s expressions 
of claims are formularised. In addition, with regard to the second issue, general 
concepts may be more versatile, and their usefulness is demonstrated within the 
empirical analysis of this paper. 
These are the outlines of my methodological suggestions in this paper. In discussing 
these issues, however, the following points should be considered. First, Chiba’s theory 
of the three dichotomies is shown as a macromodel for analysing the pluralistic 
structure of individual legal systems. In addition, there are further socio–legal debates 
over the ‘identity postulate of a legal culture’6) as a key concept in Chiba’s theory. In 
contrast, this paper is based on a microanalysis with regard to the systematic framework 
determining a litigant’s expression of claims or the contents of their claims. In other 
words, a macrotheory model concerning individual legal systems is re-evaluated as a 
microanalysis of individual dispute processes. Accordingly, this paper aims to serve 
the limited purpose of demonstrating a modified set of the three dichotomies that is 
best suited to analysing dispute processes. However, this paper does not seek to 
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perform a critical analysis of Chiba’s identity postulate of a legal culture.7)
II. Cases and Methodologies
The actual cases used in this paper are drawn from the civil disputes concerning the 
legal conditions of marriage under the customary law of the Gusii community in 
Western Kenya. In particular, the focus is on civil disputes determining whether the 
status as spouses is acknowledged for men and women who have cohabitation 
relationships but whose dowry items have not been paid.
Under the laws of Kenya, Christian, Muslim and Hindu marriages are recognised 
under their respective official marriage laws. Apart from these unions, African 
customary law marriage is also recognised under section 37 of the Marriage Act 
(Jackson 1988, pp. 51-53). However, despite this codification, the Marriage Act does 
not contain any specific content that enumerates the procedures constituting a 
customary law marriage. This lack of specificity is based on the precept that it is 
impossible to determine what constitutes a customary law marriage. However, the 
system is not as simple as it seems, and local communities typically do not share a set 
of detailed rules at the grassroots level.
The litigation cases referred to in this paper share the common feature that the 
concerned parties dispute the existence or non-existence of a marital relationship in a 
certain manner. The structure of such characteristics is explained as follows. 
1) Within the Gusii community, there is a formalistic view that the payment of 
dowry by the husband’s kin to the wife’s in the form of livestock and cash constitutes 
a customary law marriage. In fact, a few men and women finish the dowry transaction 
before commencing their cohabitation (Not many men or women establish marriage 
by submitting an official marriage application). 
2) In some cases, one spouse attempts not to provide any socio–economic support 
to the other spouse. In such cases, the spouse who wishes to avoid providing support 
often defends his or her position by citing the fact that the marriage application was 
not submitted, or that a dowry was not paid (Hakansson 1988, pp. 193-194).
3) The spouse who was betrayed, despite his or her perception that a trusting 
relationship was formed over a long period, typically introduces evidence proving the 
existence of the marital relationship, or alternatively takes the position that the 
substantive aspects of the marital relationship are more important than the material or 
‘legal’ evidence of marriage. By taking such actions, the betrayed spouse opposes the 
formalistic elements of a customary law marriage (formal rules that determine the 
relationship), such as the payment of dowry or the submission of a marriage application.
For analysing the Gusii marriage cases, I would suggest here using the dichotomy 
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between formal and substantive ways of legal reasoning as a new model, which may 
substitute for the dichotomy between legal rules and legal postulates in Chiba’s theory. 
Such a revised dichotomy builds on the previous studies in the field of legal 
anthropology. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly explain here the theoretical 
background.
Disputes do not merely reflect the interests of the concerned parties, but also require 
socio–cultural interpretation and justification. John L. Comaroff and Simon Roberts 
(1981) analysed certain disputes in this regard, focusing on the communication style 
and the subject matter of disputes in the Tswana community of southern Africa. They 
described the dispute processes from the viewpoint of how the parties themselves 
choose their ‘paradigms of argument’. Furthermore, they clarified the way ‘Tswana 
customs and laws’ (mekgwa le melao ya Setswana) are implemented in practice by a 
party choosing a ‘paradigm of argument’ in order to counter the opposing party 
(Comaroff and Roberts 1981, pp. 84-86, pp. 102-106). When regarded as a legal 
anthropological methodology for empirical legal research, Comaroff and Roberts’ 
arguments can be summarised as follows: conflicting interests during a dispute are 
structured within the social context in which the parties’ lives are embedded. At the 
same time, the interests of self-seeking parties must conform to the socio–cultural 
values or reasonableness in order for them to gain validity. To meet these two 
requirements, the issue of why and how disputes occur is determined by the social 
conditions specific to the community in question. The claims by parties are, therefore, 
characterised by the socio–cultural context within each community. 
Developing Chiba’s theory from the actor-oriented perspectives shown in this paper 
is no longer an unexplored endeavour nowadays. Werner Menski (2000, 2006, 2009, 
2011), Ihsan Yilmaz (2005) and Prakash Shah (2005, p. 9), for example, carefully read 
Chiba’s papers on legal actors (Chiba 1989, Chapter 8, 1995, 1998, see also Mori 
2009), together with Roger Ballard’s discussion on ‘skilled cultural navigators’ 8), to 
address the ‘skilful navigation’ of legal pluralism, ‘skilled legal navigators’ and ‘the 
subjective perspective of the recipient of legal pluralism’, respectively. From the 
perspective of ‘a user theory of law’, as Laura Nader writes, ‘the plaintiff is the life of 
the law’ (Nader 2002, p. 15 and p. 210). In other words, it can be said that the place of 
legal actors is quite important for democratisation and decolonisation of legal 
pluralism. 
III. Case Analyses
In Kenya, the basic mechanism of the conflicts of interest observable in farming 
villages (informal dispute resolution) can often be seen in official court trials (official 
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dispute resolution). These trials occur simply because parties who could not resolve 
their case at the village meetings bring their case to official courts. From the time when 
they are brought to the official courts, the disputes arising in these communities are 
subjected to an entirely different systematic framework. The dispute resolution 
processes will be different even when the basic structure of the conflicts of interest is 
similar, because of the way official courts undertake the examination of evidence and 
the recognition of facts. Accordingly, this paper examines both cases tried by village 
meetings and those tried by official courts. The analysed cases concern disputes over 
the legal validity of ‘customary law marriage’ when dowry items have not been paid.
Orumba Case: Dowry Non-payment and the Identity Card 
I attended a baraza (Kiswahili: meeting) organised by an administrative chief9) on 2 
October 1999. The meeting began at nine o’clock in the morning. It continued until 
half past one in the afternoon without any break, and addressed five cases. One of the 
cases took one hour but was not completely resolved. This case will hereafter be called 
the ‘Orumba Case’ (Orumba is the name of a deceased male).
The meeting was occurred between Nyangweso, who claimed to be Orumba’s wife 
(his second wife), and the sons of the first wife (deceased), John and Omboke. Both 
parties disputed the settlement of Orumba’s land property. Orumba, John and Omboke 
all belong to the same agnatic lineage.10) 
On 2 October, Nyangweso filed the case to the area chief, claiming that she was not 
even permitted to live on the land that Orumba had left. She claimed that she needed a 
piece of land so that she could live with her unmarried son. 
On the other hand, John and Omboke maintained that Nyangweso was not actually 
Orumba’s wife. They argued that under the Gusii customary law, a couple is married 
when the groom gives dowry to the bride’s relatives in the form of livestock and/or 
cash. Since the beginning of Nyangweso and Orumba’s cohabitation, no such 
transaction had taken place. Moreover, Nyangweso was already married to another 
man prior to her cohabitation with Orumba, and had already found someone to live 
with after separating from Orumba. After moving from one place to another in this 
way, Nyangweso began to worry about how she could make a living in her old age, and 
suddenly returned 20 years after her separation from Orumba and attempted to obtain 
a part of his estate. The primary issue in this case is not the fact that she was absent for 
20 years, but that there were no transactions of livestock or cash at the time of marriage. 
On 2 October, the chief listened to the claims made by both parties. However, he 
ordered them to settle the case by meeting once more at their lineage meeting. By this 
stage, the parties had already held two meetings. The secretary of the meeting, 
Omwange, held the record of the Orumba case on 17 July and 7 August 1999. The 
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names of all participants were recorded for both occasions, and the positions of each 
participant regarding the allocations of the land were listed. According to the trial 
record, most of the residents who attended the meeting on 17 July took John and 
Omboke’s side, and argued that the land should not be allocated to Nyangweso. The 
lineage members held another meeting in August and decided to deliver the verdict 
after that. 
On 7 August, the second meeting was held. This time most of the participants took 
Nyangweso’s side and argued that the land should be allocated to her. Some pointed 
out that the fact that the father of Nyangweso’s son was Orumba should be taken into 
consideration. Others emphasised that the national identity card issued by the 
government of Kenya listed sufficient facts to prove that Nyangweso was Orumba’s 
wife. 
The identity card in fact included Orumba’s name within Nyangweso’s name. In 
Kenya, the national identity card name can be amended such that the husband’s name 
becomes a part of the wife’s name. However, under the Registration of Persons Act, 
when a woman changes her name, her husband must accompany her and provide the 
office with his signature and fingerprint. Some criticise this practice as a discriminatory 
law against women, but many accept it because there are no other substitutes. This is 
because unless the husband is required to approve such changes, women can use men’s 
names and claim to be their ‘wives’ without any proof. In other words, the identity card 
is regarded as carrying a significant amount of legal weight to the extent of causing 
such debates on membership in a family, and the elders are also well aware of this fact. 
At the meeting, the elders emphasised the importance of the fact that the father of 
Nyangweso’s son was Orumba, and that her name on the identity card included 
Orumba’s name, in addition to the fact that Nyangweso was an elderly woman. In the 
end, they concluded that the land should be allocated to her as well. 
John and Omboke were extremely angered by this decision, and a scuffle broke out 
between them and the faction supporting Nyangweso. Because of this situation, 
Nyangweso could not peacefully relocate to the land in question even after the decision 
had been approved by the elders. Moreover, as already stated, Nyangweso brought the 
case up to the administrative chief on 2 October, but the case was remanded to the 
lineage meeting again without any solution. As far as I am aware, the third meeting has 
not yet been held within the lineage. 
According to the lineage elders, the land should not have been allocated to 
Nyangweso if the customs were strictly followed because there were no dowry 
transactions. However, they also pointed out the fact that Orumba was the father of 
Nyangweso’s son and that such a fact cannot be ignored either. Thus, the elders had to 
make an extremely difficult decision. 
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The essence of the Orumba case can be summarised as follows: John and Omboke 
(sons of the first wife) could not allow the allocation of land to Nyangweso (a woman 
who claimed to be their father’s wife), who was absent for 20 years and suddenly 
appeared to make a claim to a part of the land. The sons argued that there was no 
marriage (under customary law) because dowries had not been paid. On the other 
hand, Nyangweso sought to be recognized with the status of Orumba’s wife and have 
his estate settled accordingly by putting forward the facts of cohabitation with him and 
of giving birth to his son. Furthermore, she argued that the fact that she was Orumba’s 
wife was clear from the contents of her identity card. The basic structures of the parties’ 
positions are as follows:
1) John and Omboke (denying the allocation of property)
substantive reasoning (paradigm 1S)
separation: absence of marital relationship 
formal reasoning (paradigm 1F)
non-payment of dowry: absence of marital relationship
2) Nyangweso (claiming the allocation of property) 
substantive reasoning (paradigm 2S)
cohabitation/parent–child relationship: existence of marital relationship
formal reasoning (paradigm 2F)
national identity card: existence of marital relationship
During the first lineage meeting, John and Omboke sought to deny the allocation of 
property by selecting both paradigms 1S and 1F by arguing the non-existence of a 
marital relationship. On the other hand, by selecting paradigm 2S, Nyangweso argued 
that a marital relationship did exist, and thus demanded the allocation of property. 
However, note that the conflict of opinions changed its character at the second meeting, 
when Nyangweso brought in paradigm 2F, namely the listing in her identity card, to 
prove the existence of the marital relationship. 
There are two important points here. First, the substantive and formal methods of 
legal reasoning are paradigms supporting claims by both parties at the second meeting. 
Parties to the dispute did not agree on the critical issue of whether to deny (1) or grant 
(2) the allocation of the property. If 1S, 1F, 2S and 2F were not selected as paradigms 
argued in the case, these factors by themselves would not constitute mutually exclusive 
or inconsistent relationships. For example, the listings in the identity card, which were 
used to prove the existence of marriage in this case, could also be used for disproving 
the existence of marriage in other instances. In such cases, it would not even be used 
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as proof. Accordingly, the paradigm claiming certain positions only constitutes 
opposing relationships when selected by the parties concerned. 
Second, note that formal and substantive reasoning are related as parallel concepts 
but not in a cause-and-effect relationship. The former does not arise from the 
formularisation of the latter. Both arise from the formularisation of a specific relational 
norm, but in a different shape: What are the characteristics of a marital relationship? Is 
its legal significance determined by formal indicators such as the payment of dowries 
or by the listings in the identity card (civil law marriage)? Alternatively, is it determined 
by the actual contents of the relationship such as cohabitation, the birth of a child, or 
separation (common law marriage)? Both are significantly different in the way the 
legal significance is formulated. 
Gladys Case: Non-payment of Dowry and the Presumption of Marriage
The analysis of the Orumba case in the previous section was undertaken in the 
village meetings. The opposition of claims, as witnessed in disputes such as the 
Orumba case, is often handled by official courts, and decisions are delivered after 
certain procedures have been performed. How do the courts try these cases, and how 
are the decisions reached? This section will address these topics. 
The case mentioned here will hereafter be called the Gladys case.11) Gladys died of 
illness on 17 February 2000, when she was 40 years old. At the court (The Chief 
Magistrate Court at Kisii), a dispute occurred over where to bury her body. In a manner 
similar to the Orumba case, a party who claimed to be the spouse of the deceased 
demanded the allocation of a parcel of land, and the other party attempted to deny any 
such entitlement by questioning the validity of the marital relationship between the 
deceased and the claiming party. Therefore, the factual basis of what constitutes a 
marital relationship became the centre of dispute in this case also. 
In brief, a presumption of marriage was recognised in a judgment on 20 March 
2000, on the basis of a view that acknowledged a common law marriage, despite the 
lack of elements clearly constituting a marriage. As demonstrated in the Gladys case, 
Gusii burial cases often rely on the common law ‘presumption of marriage’ as the legal 
basis. ‘Presumption of marriage’ is the view recognised in a common law marriage 
that makes a presumption of a marriage between two parties when both parties cohabit 
with agreement and establish their reputation as a married couple, even without the 
presentation of any dispositive proof, as far as no opposing proof is presented. 
Regulation of a formal relationship relies on the legal requirements constituting a 
customary marriage, such as the payment of a dowry. On the other hand, common law 
marriage is referred to as the opposing paradigm in that it discredits claims that rely on 
customary law, from the viewpoint of the substantive reasoning of the marital 
Formal and Substantive Reasoning about Marriage in Kenyan Legal Pluralism 75
relationship through the ‘presumption of marriage’.
The record of the Gladys case included a 16-page typewritten document, the 
judgment and the photocopies of precedents and law books. Ten witnesses for the 
plaintiff, including an expert witness of Gusii customary law, spoke at the trial. In 
contrast, for the defendant, only one witness attended the trial. This shows that 
producing a large quantity of evidence as proof and holding long examination processes 
were required for the plaintiff to prove the existence of a common law marriage 
through the ‘presumption of marriage’.
Gladys worked as an administrator for the Egerton University Kisii campus and 
possessed a piece of land under her name, located close to the Kisii campus. The size 
of the land was 465 square metres. Parties to the Gladys case sought to obtain the right 
to inherit this land. The reason why the burial location was disputed was that the land 
would be her father’s if she was buried at her parents’ home, and it would be the 
spouse’s families’ if she was buried by them. In this case, similar to the Orumba case, 
the marital identity of the deceased became an issue. 
Nelson Nyangera, who appeared as an expert witness for the trial, submitted his 
book entitled ‘The making of men and women under Abagusii customary law’ 
(Nyangera 1999). During the trial, he provided testimony regarding the elements that 
constitute a customary law marriage by summarising the contents of his book. He 
referred to page 86 of the book, which points out that ‘legalising the elopement into 
marriage’ is possible if the agreement of the wife’s parents to accept dowry items is 
secured immediately before the deceased wife’s burial. This is consistent with the 
testimony he provided in several other similar cases. He maintained that a dowry 
payment is the crucial constituent element of a customary marriage, while pointing out 
that the dowry itself can be paid at any time once both parties agree on the transaction. 
The plaintiffs were Robert and Paul, who were the brothers of the man who lived 
with Gladys, and the defendant was Anderson, the father of the deceased. According 
to the plaintiffs, Gladys had married a man called Fred in 1983. Fred, who was 
employed as a driver for the Ministry of Livestock, had two sons with Gladys before 
he died of a traffic accident while working. Gladys had a child from her previous 
partner, and Robert lived with Gladys after his brother Fred’s death ‘as his substitute’, 
and they had two sons. In total, Gladys gave birth to five children. 
According to the plaintiffs, there was no dowry payment, but Gladys’ father, 
Anderson, had recognised the marital relationship between his daughter and Fred. 
Both families reached an agreement for the dowry payment of sixty thousand shillings, 
two cows and two goats, and Fred’s family was prepared to pay the dowry at any time. 
However, Anderson changed his attitude after Gladys’ death and refused the dowry. 
The marital relationship of Gladys and Fred had been widely recognised. The 
Formal and Substantive Reasoning about Marriage in Kenyan Legal Pluralism76
employee’s list at Fred’s workplace even listed Gladys as his wife. Moreover, Gladys, 
as Fred’s wife, had buried him, and as his wife, had also received the Ministry of 
Livestock consolatory money. When Gladys purchased the land in question using her 
name as the titular, the plaintiff Robert accompanied her as a guardian and even paid a 
part of the cost. Robert also took Gladys to the hospital immediately before her death, 
and undertook all the procedures of placing her body in mortuary. Using these facts as 
evidence, the advocate for the plaintiffs argued that the customary law marriage should 
be recognised because the payments of dowry had been agreed upon, and because the 
‘presumption of marriage’ between Gladys and Fred by common law was applicable. 
On the basis of these facts, the advocate argued the plaintiffs’ rights to bury Gladys. 
On the other hand, Anderson denied the plaintiffs’ claims in full and argued that 
Gladys was not married. He stated that a customary law marriage does not take place 
without the dowry payment, and that Fred neither paid nor negotiated nor agreed to 
make such payments. The defendants’ lawyer, while maintaining that a customary law 
marriage did not exist, argued that English common law does not unconditionally 
apply to Kenya, and precluded the application of a ‘presumption of marriage’ argument. 
In delivering the decision, the magistrate merely adopted the part of Nyangera’s 
testimony that the payment of a dowry constitutes the customary marriage, and did not 
assign any weight to the arguments that an agreement to receive a dowry by the wife’s 
parents could also constitute the marriage. In the end, the magistrate reached the 
conclusion that there was no customary marriage between Fred and Gladys because 
there was no dowry payment. However, the magistrate also concluded that the 
‘presumption of marriage’ was applicable by virtue of the considerable evidence 
presented by the plaintiffs. In delivering the judgment, this evidence turned out to be 
the deciding factor in convincing the judge to adopt the ‘presumption of marriage’. 
The judgment was that Gladys was Fred’s wife and that the plaintiffs had the right 
to bury her. In making the decision, the judge ordered that the plaintiffs pay sixty 
thousand shillings, four cows and two goats to the defendants via the court. Such an 
order was based on the conclusion that a customary law marriage could arise from the 
dowry payment. The facts listed included the cohabitation of Gladys and Fred, their 
two children and the recognition of Fred’s status as Gladys’ husband at his workplace. 
In addition, Gladys received constant support from the brothers prior to her death. On 
the basis of these facts, the brothers argued that a marital relationship should be 
presumed. 
This case can be summarised as follows: The deceased Gladys’ father (Anderson) 
claimed that his daughter, Gladys, and Fred (also deceased) were not married because 
there was no dowry payment. On the other hand, Fred’s brothers (Robert and Paul) 
produced facts proving the existence of the marital relationship. The basic opposing 
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structure of the opinion is as follows.
3) Anderson (seeking to deny the allocation of property)
formal reasoning (paradigm 3F)
non-payment of dowry: non-existence of marital relationship
4) Robert and Paul (claiming the allocation of property)
substantive reasoning (paradigm 4S)
cohabitation/parent–child relationship: existence of marital relationship
How was the inherent conflict between paradigms 3F and 4S reconciled by this 
trial? The court adopted most of the evidence provided by Fred’s side (through Robert 
and Paul) and ‘presumed’ a marriage to exist between Fred and Gladys, but at the same 
time, decided that no ‘customary law marriage’ existed between them because the 
dowry was not paid. In other words, neither paradigm 3F nor paradigm 4S was denied, 
and the right to bury Gladys and to inherit her estate was given to the late Fred’s side. 
The key to understanding this decision is the logic that allows the ‘customary law 
marriage’ to exist upon the payment of dowry as the formal reasoning (3F) to be the 
determinative fact, despite the fact that both the husband and wife were already 
deceased. In short, Anderson, who argued the non-existence of the marital relationship, 
lost the case, but paradigm 3F itself (that the non-payment of the dowry is an indicator 
that a marital relationship does not exist), was not negated. As discussed in subsection 
3-1, the paradigm of argument forms the opposing relationship by the selection of 
parties. Accordingly, there is no a priori conflict between particular paradigms. 
The above paragraphs analysed how the claims of the concerned parties are 
expressed and formularised by utilising the dichotomy between the formal and 
substantive ways of legal reasoning. In the following paragraphs, another two 
dichotomies will be added, and the Gladys case will be compared with the Orumba 
case. 
Comparative Analysis
As discussed in section 1, Chiba’s analytical tools are quite useful for grasping the 
complex process of the pluralisation of law. In this paper, I proposed a new dichotomy 
between the formal and substantive ways of legal reasoning, instead of using the 
dichotomy between legal rules and legal postulates as Chiba did. The table below 
shows how the dichotomy between official and unofficial laws, and that between 
indigenous and transplanted laws can be ‘combined’, when they are introduced as the 
analytical concepts for the above case studies.12)
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Orumba Case:  unofficial dispute resolution (lineage meeting)
Paradigm 1F  formal reasoning (non-payment of dowry: non-existence of marriage) 
 indigenous law (customary law)
Paradigm 2F formal reasoning (identity card: existence of marriage)
 transplanted law (statutory law)
Gladys Case:  official dispute resolution (magistrate court)
Paradigm 3F  formal reasoning (non-payment of dowry: non-existence of marriage)
 indigenous law (customary law)
Paradigm 4S substantive reasoning (cohabitation/children: existence of marriage)
 transplanted law (English common law)
An important observation here is that there is no universal manner in which formal 
and substantive reasoning can be combined. Formal reasoning can be combined with 
the indigenous law as well as the transplanted law, and the transplanted law can be 
combined with substantive reasoning.
Initially, the dichotomy between official and unofficial laws is recognised by 
contrasting the systematic framework of dispute resolution, whether the case is heard 
by elders at a village meeting or by the official state court. In addition, in this scenario, 
the indigenous law may obtain the status of the official law as African customary law 
during the dispute resolution processes at the court. The above paradigms 1F and 3F 
are similar in the way that the indigenous law is used so that the concerned parties can 
express their claims. However, they are different in the manner in which the latter 
gains the status as the official law by the court. In other words, there is a qualitative 
difference between paradigms 1F and 3F within the dichotomy between official and 
unofficial laws. 
Next, the dichotomy between indigenous and transplanted laws is similar to Chiba’s 
definition in that his theory examines whether such a dichotomy originates in the local 
culture of the society in question. In both Orumba case and Gladys case, there was a 
conflict between the expression of claims by indigenous laws and that by transplanted 
laws. They are different, on the other hand, in the way the dichotomy between 
transplanted and indigenous laws is combined with the dichotomy between formal and 
substantive reasoning. For example, the transplanted law in the Orumba case was used 
as the paradigm for expressing the party’s claims through formal reasoning (paradigm 
2F). In contrast, the transplanted law in the Gladys case was used as the paradigm for 
expressing the party’s claim through substantive reasoning (paradigm 4S). 
In summary, the dichotomy between indigenous and transplanted laws and that 
between formal and substantive reasoning are combined throughout the processes of 
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parties formularising their expression of claims. 
IV. Conclusion
As previously stated, there is as yet no standard by which marriage may be formally 
defined in the Gusii community in Kenya, where currently various forms of ‘marriage’ 
are recognised as customary law marriages, other than the civil marriage under the 
state law. This paper has analysed cases in which disputes over the legal conditions of 
a customary law marriage in the Gusii community were heard at a village meeting and 
the official court. 
With regard to the Orumba case, as analysed in subsection 3-1, the conflict was 
between two types of arguments, each based on the formal reasoning of how marriage 
may be defined. With regard to the Gladys case, there was a conflict between the 
formal and substantive ways of legal reasoning. In each type of conflict, the party 
expressing their claims by the formal reasoning regarding relationships relied on the 
customary law as a paradigm to support their claims. Because of this approach, the 
customary law the parties referred to led to an extremely formalistic view of the ‘law’. 
The argument that a customary law marriage is a legal relationship constituted by a 
dowry payment is by itself a paradigm that supports a certain claim.
This paper attempted to extract the characteristic features of the parties’ expression 
of claims to observe the combinations of the three dichotomies, namely the dichotomy 
between official and unofficial laws, the dichotomy between transplanted and 
indigenous laws and the dichotomy between formal and substantive ways of legal 
reasoning. In this sense, the analysis presented in subsection 3-3 corresponds to the 
conclusion of this paper as empirical research. I understand that the combinations of 
dichotomies show an actual example of the contemporary dynamics of Kenyan legal 
pluralism. 
Chiba uses the dichotomy between legal rules and legal postulates in order to 
compare the qualitative characteristics of legal formalisation. However, this dichotomy 
is modelled on the dual structure of state law and is difficult to apply to unwritten laws. 
In this paper, I have proposed a new dichotomy for capturing the characteristics of 
formularising the party’s expression of claims, a dichotomy useful for the structural 
analysis of dispute processes at the microlevel, not the dichotomy for structural 
analysis of laws at the macrolevel. This paper then explored the dichotomy between 
formal and substantive ways of legal reasoning. In summary, the expression of claims 
by parties or legal actors is the driving force of the dispute process. Therefore, a way 
of understanding the plural system at the empirical level is possible by capturing the 
way parties formulate the expression of their claims from various angles. This 
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dichotomy is the operative concept for clarifying how the parties formularise the 
expression of their claims within the conflicting and pluralising phases of the dispute 
processes.
Note
1)  An earlier version of this paper first appeared in Japanese at a Japanese journal, Hosyakaigaku (Sociology of Law) 64, 
in September 2006, and later presented in English at a conference, Towards a General Theory of Legal Culture in a 
Global Context: Chiba Memorial Symposium, at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London on 
26 March 2012. It benefitted from comments from the anonymous reviewers of the journal and the participants of the 
conference, and has been revised with additions for publication here.
2)  Internationally known works of Werner Menski (2006) and Ihsan Yilmaz (2005) also address the modification of 
Chiba’s three-dichotomy theory in their respective ways. It may sound paradoxical, but one of the great advantages of 
Chiba’s theory lies in its theoretical non-self-sufficiency, which always invites other scholars to expand the field with 
more sophisticated models. 
3)  The Gusii or Abagusii are Bantu-speaking people, inhabiting the south–western highlands of Kenya. Because of the 
mild climate and abundant rainfall, their land is quite rich in agricultural production. The name ‘Kisii’ is of a colonial 
terminology. The people were referred to as the Kisii in the colonial period, and even nowadays, their largest town and 
administrative districts retain their colonial names. Previous anthropological works on the customary marriage laws of 
the Gusii include Mayer 1950, Hakkanson 1988, Matsuzono 1988, Shadle 1999 and Ishida 2002. 
4)  Chiba’s dichotomy of legal rules and postulates was first given using a different terminology for the dichotomy, 
framing it as between positive rules and postulative values (Chiba 1986, p. 393).
5)  I refer to brideprice or bridewealth as ‘dowry’ in this paper, according to the common English terminology in Kenya. 
In other words, it represents a sum of marriage gifts given to a bride’s parents and/or brothers by the agnatic kin of the 
bridegroom.
6)  Interestingly, there is a slight but important difference between the English and Japanese terminologies. The concept 
of the identity postulate of a legal culture is translated as the identity principle in Chiba’s papers published in the 
Japanese language. 
7)  Ishida (2009) discussed Chiba’s concept of the identity postulate of a legal culture. See also Takeshi Tsunoda’s review 
on the concept (Tsunoda 2009). 
8)  Roger Ballard, “Introduction: The emergence of Desh Pardesh”, in Roger Ballard ed. Desh Pardesh: The South Asian 
presence in Britain, London: Hurst, p. 31.
9)  Administrative chief is a government-appointed officer who is in charge of law and order in his village or ‘location’ 
(administrative unit). Chiefs are appointed from among middle-aged villagers, men and women. They are not 
necessarily experts in customary laws or local traditions, but are well educated enough to speak and write the English 
language, which is often required in paper work.
10)  Lineage is a kin group comprised of relatives whose family genealogy can be traced back.
11)  Chief Magistrate’s Court at Kisii, Civil Case No. 124 of 2000.
12)  I observe that the dichotomy between indigenous and transplanted laws is indispensable in the Kenyan context. This 
observation of mine is different from that of Yilmaz (2005: 25), who noted that Chiba’s ‘third dichotomy (indigenous 
law versus received law) is not really a separate dichotomy’.
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Abstract
This paper aims to apply the empirical research on dispute processes to Masaji Chiba’s 
theory on legal pluralism. The task requires a partial modification of Chiba’s three-
dichotomy theory, especially of his first dichotomy between legal rules and legal 
postulates. The original dichotomy is for comparing the qualitative characteristics of 
legal formalisation, but modelled on the dual structure of state law. In this paper, I 
propose an alternative dichotomy for capturing the characteristics of formularising the 
party’s arguments. This paper then explored the dichotomy between formal and 
substantive ways of legal reasoning. In this paper, I will analyse cases of family 
disputes observed in Kenyan official and unofficial forums using a revised version of 
the three-dichotomy theory. The actual cases used in this paper are drawn from the 
civil disputes concerning the legal conditions of marriage under the customary law of 
the Gusii community of Kenya.
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